Corrupt compared to what? Greece, capitalist interests, and the specular purity of the state by Bratsis, Peter
 
 
 
Discussion Paper No. 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corrupt Compared to What? 
Greece, Capitalist Interests, and the Specular Purity of the State 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Peter Bratsis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
August 2003 
 
 
 
The Hellenic Observatory 
The European Institute 
 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
This paper was made possible by a research fellowship from the Hellenic Observatory 
of the European Institute.  It is based on a talk given at the London School of 
Economics on October 22, 2002.  Many of the ideas and arguments presented here 
were developed during discussions with Constantine Tsoukalas, without his input and 
encouragement this paper would not have been possible.  Stanley Aronowitz, John 
Bowman, Andreas Karras, Lenny Markovitz, Randy Martin, Eleni Natsiopoulou, 
Frances Fox Piven and Yannis Stavrakakis have read earlier versions of key sections 
of the current paper and have provided important comments and suggestions.  Kevin 
Featherstone and Dimitris Papadimitriou have been kind enough to read the paper and 
provide useful criticisms and suggestions.  I hope that the arguments contained here 
are clear and provocative enough to engender discussion.   
Table of Contents 
 
 
Introduction: Political Corruption and Greece 
 
Part I: Legitimation 
 What is Political Corruption? 
 Why Corruption? 
 Rules of Separation: From Leviticus to Washington D.C. 
 The Australian Case: Fetishism Revealed 
 
Part II: Accumulation 
 The Opacity of Transparency 
 Instrumental Reason and the Relative Autonomy of the State 
 The Globalization of the Capitalist State 
 
Conclusion: Future Directions for Research on Corruption and Greece 
 
Works Cited 
 3
 
Introduction: Political Corruption and Greece 
 
Political corruption is under attack.  Technocrats, mainstream academics, and 
media pundits qua ‘experts’ have increasingly set their sights upon the blight of 
corruption. The most visible and symptomatic of these recent efforts to counter 
corruption have been those propagated by Transparency International (TI).  Funded 
by the World Bank, various national ministries, and a few dozen multinational 
corporations, including the infamous Enron and Arthur Anderson, TI bills itself as an 
“international movement” that is fighting corruption through “national, regional and 
global coalitions, embracing the state, civil society and the private sector.” 1   From 
the perspective of TI, political corruption should be opposed because of the dramatic 
effects it has upon the material well being of the world’s poor and dispossessed.  For 
Peter Eigen, a former World Bank official and the founder and Chairman of TI, 
corruption is a main cause of poverty and suffering: 
Political elites and their cronies continue to take kickbacks at every 
opportunity.  Hand in glove with corrupt business people, they are 
trapping whole nations in poverty and hampering sustainable 
development (TI 2002). 
 
Similarly, Tunku Abdul Aziz, TI’s Vice-Chairman, has asserted that: 
 
Corruption continues to deny the poor, the marginalised, and the least 
educated members of every society the social, economic and political 
benefits that should properly accrue to them (TI 2002).  
 
Upon releasing its 2002 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), TI declared that 
“Over two thirds of the world’s countries are rife with corruption – a spectre haunting 
                                                 
1  This is according to the TI web site.  The quotes are taken from Peter Eigen’s 
description of TI at http://www.transparency.org/about_ti/index.html.  The list of 
donors can be found at http://www.transparency.org/about_ti/donors.html, it should 
be noted that as of the end of 2002 one could navigate to the page where this list of 
donors appears directly through TI’s web site.  There is no longer a link to this list of 
donors on the TI web site but it can be accessed directly by entering the full address 
listed above. 
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Latin America, the former Soviet states and vast swathes of Africa (TI 2002).”  
Within this context, Greece received special mention as, by far, the most corrupt of 
any state within the European Union.  Greece was ranked 44th out of 102 countries 
with a raw score of 4.2 (on a 1 to 10 range), the next highest within the EU was Italy, 
which was ranked 31st with a raw score of 5.2.  By way of further comparison, the 
next highest ranked EU nations were France and Portugal, both 25th with a raw score 
of 6.3.  Indeed, Greece was ranked well bellow Namibia (28th) and Botswana (24th) 
and was much closer in raw score to the lowest ranked country (Bangladesh, 1.2) than 
the highest (Finland, 9.7) (TI 2002).    
The academic literature on corruption in Greece has tended to reflect the claim 
that Greek society tends towards corruption and has also tended to argue that the 
cause is some pathological presence within Greece itself.  Illustrative of these 
tendencies are the arguments by Kleomenis Koutsoukis.  For Koutsoukis, Greece 
suffers from what he terms the ‘ideoteles institution of society’ (1993).2  This 
‘ideotelesness’ refers to the tendency of members of the society to act in ways that 
further their own interests at the expense of the public interest.   This tendency, in 
turn, is best understood as the product of social underdevelopment and ‘imbalances’, 
from low levels of political socialization, to the inefficacies of the state or its lack of 
legitimacy, to the scarcities of material goods relative to social expectations 
(Koutsoukis 1993, 3-13).  According to Koutsoukis: 
                                                 
2 This awkward term of ‘ideoteles institution of society’ is derived from the title of the 
book by Cornelius Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society.  It is unclear why 
Koutsoukis chooses this term since he makes no arguments regarding how society is 
produced or ‘instituted’ (Castoriadis’s use of the term) but rather seems to use the 
term institution in the more common way, as an organization or arena within society.  
Moreover, the term seems to be of no utility since it is saying little more than that 
corruption occurs when people pursue their own interests at the expense of the public 
interest. 
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Thus an idioteles society seems to be a manifestation, for a large part 
of society, that an imbalance exists not only between rights and duties 
but between public and private interests and between individual and 
social, tradition and modernity as well (Koutsoukis 1993, 11).3  
 
These arguments by Koutsoukis illustrate the deep seeded conviction that there is 
something pathological within Greek politics and culture and that the main task at 
hand is to identify this pathology and find an explanation for it by examining Greek 
society, by discovering those fissures and contradictions in Greece’s ongoing 
movement from tradition to modernity.   
 Implicitly in TI’s numbers and explicitly in arguments such as Koutsoukis’s, 
the problem of corruption in Greece is seen as one caused by the Greeks themselves.    
The point of departure for the present paper is to reverse the gaze, to not look to 
Greece in order to discover the source of its ‘corruption’ problem.  Rather, this paper 
looks from Greece outwards in order to uncover why it is that people judge Greece to 
be corrupt.4  The paradoxical position of this paper is that the sources of the problem 
of corruption in Greece can not be found in Greece, they are to be found in the 
seemingly less corrupt states of the West (particularly the United States), in those 
concepts, rituals and myths that enable countless instances of private regarding within 
the public to be judged normal and acceptable and which shape our perceptions of 
Greek political life as being pathological.  Although I do not doubt the presence of 
                                                 
3 The periodization of corruption in Greece can, according to Koutsoukis, be 
organized according to the underlying structural and developmental imbalances: first, 
1946-1966, where the main culprit is clientelism and insufficient resources to meet 
the demands of the growing urban classes, second, 1967-1974, where the military 
junta’s emphasis on investment and its desire to stay in power allowed for an marked 
rise in the power of wealthy individuals/potential investors, and finally, 1974 and 
onwards, where the new ethos of modernization and the corresponding expansion of 
the state apparatuses came into conflict with more traditional views and segments of 
Greek society, resulting in an authoritarian encroachment of the public sector into 
what had been private domains (Koutsoukis 1989, 3-7). 
4 It should be emphasized that the index produced by TI is of perceptions of 
corruption, how academics, businesspeople, and other ‘experts’, perceive the country 
in question. 
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clientelism or bribery in Greece, I do question why these things (and not many others) 
should be considered a corruption.   For example, why is it that clientelism should be 
a corruption but not corporatism or interest group politics?  The spontaneous 
understandings and categorizations that we hold in our heads and which lead us to 
characterize some phenomenon as a corruption and others as not are what this paper 
seeks to uncover.  
 This paper is organized into two parts, in the first part the specificity of what 
we understand as corruption is identified.  It opposition to the dominant view that 
corruption is a problem that has plagued societies since antiquity, this paper will 
argue that there is a marked difference between traditional and modern 
understandings of corruption.  It will be argued that what we understand as corruption 
only comes into being with modernity and the corresponding organization of social 
life and interests by way of the categories of the public and private.  According to this 
view, the main function of the modern concept of corruption is to keep the categories 
of the public and private pure and believable, the homology between modern 
corruption rules and the rules regarding clean and unclean foods in Leviticus is 
demonstrated.  Based upon these insights, examples are given from the United States 
and Australia in order to demonstrate how laws and procedures shape and define what 
we perceive as corruption and in order to illustrate the argument that the division 
between the corrupt and non-corrupt is exclusively on the level of perception.  In the 
second part of this paper, the recent international focus on corruption is examined.  
Efforts such as those by TI and other organizations are examined in order to 
understand why it is now that such movements have arisen and why is it that the 
agents of finance and global commerce seem to be increasingly concerned with the 
question of corruption.  The relationship between state forms and accumulation 
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strategies will be examined and it will be argued that, in addition to the function of 
keeping the categories of the public and private pure (a function of legitimation), the 
question of corruption in the context of globalization has also become a means of 
transforming state forms in ways that secure their relative autonomy, decrease the 
transaction costs for global investments, and allow for more predictable cost and 
benefit measures for potential investors.  Lastly, I will discuss what all of this means 
for Greece and identify future lines of research for the question of Greece and 
corruption.   
 
Part I: Legitimation 
What’s breaking into a bank compared with founding a bank? 
 - Bertolt Brecht, The Threepenny Opera  
 
Defilement is never an isolated event.  It cannot occur except in view of a systematic 
ordering of ideas.  Hence any piecemeal interpretation of pollution rules of another 
culture is bound to fail.  For the only way in which pollution ideas make sense is in 
reference to a total structure of thought whose key-stone, boundaries, margins and 
internal lines are held in relation by rituals of separation. 
- Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger 
 
What is Political Corruption? 
Most all definitions of political corruption tend to emphasize the subversion of 
the public good by private interest.  Among the more famous definitions of 
corruption, Joseph Nye has defined it as: “ ... behavior which deviates from the formal 
duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private 
clique) pecuniary or state gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types 
of private-regarding influence (Nye 1989, 966).”  Similarly, Carl Friedrich has argued 
that:  
Corruption is a kind of behavior which deviates from the norm actually 
prevalent or believed to prevail in a given context, such as the political.  
It is deviant behavior associated with a particular motivation, namely 
that of private gain at public expense.  But whether this was the 
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motivation or not, it is the fact that private gain was secured at public 
expense that matters.  Such private gain may be a monetary one, and in 
the minds of the general public it usually is, but it may take other 
forms (Friedrich 1989, 15).5 
 
Contained within the modern understanding of corruption are two interrelated 
assumptions, that mutually exclusive public and private interests exist and that public 
servants must necessarily abstract themselves from the realm of the private in order to 
properly function. 
 The significance and relative historical novelty of this definition has been 
ignored in the contemporary literature on political corruption.  The tendency has been 
to emphasize the continuity of the concept of political corruption from the ancient to 
modern times.  Carl Friedrich has argued that the basic understanding of corruption 
as, “... a general disease of the body politic ... (Friedrich 1989, 18),” is common to the 
ancients and the moderns.  John Noonan, having defined bribery, presumably the 
most obvious form of political corruption, as “… an inducement improperly 
influencing the performance of a public function … (Noonan 1984, xi),” traces the 
concept back to roughly 3000 B.C. and claims that, although the concept has 
transformed over time, it has, in its main contours, remained constant.   
 Along the same lines, there are usually numerous references to Aristotle and 
Machiavelli when tracing the history of the concept of corruption.  Aristotle is often 
cited for his assertion that political forms can be corrupted.  In Aristotle’s 
classification of the three kinds of constitution, he lists kingship, aristocracy, and 
                                                 
5 For a discussion of the various ways that political corruption has been defined, see 
Heidenheimer, Johnston, and LeVine (1989).  They argue that there are three ways 
that corruption has been defined: ‘public office centered,’ as a deviation from the 
requisites of public office, ‘market centered,’ as rent seeking activity by civil servants, 
and ‘public interest centered,’ as action that does damage to the public interest.  All 
three of these forms of definition contain the idea that the public is subverted by the 
private. 
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polity.6  He goes on to note that each can be corrupted.  His discussion of kingship is 
particularly relevant because what constitutes the corruption of kinship into tyranny is 
the disregard the tyrant has for his subjects, he rules only to further his own ‘interests’ 
(cf. Aristotle 1958, 373-375).  Machiavelli’s discussion of the function and causes of 
corruption are also often discussed, especially as he developed them in The 
Discourses regarding the decline of the republic of Rome (cf. Machiavelli 1970, esp. 
Book 1).  Sara Shumer has noted that inclusive in Machiavelli’s discussion of 
corruption is the idea of the subversion of the public by the private:  
One dimension of political corruption is the privatization both of the 
average citizen and those in office.  In the corrupt state, men locate 
their values wholly within the private sphere and they use the public 
sphere to promote private interests (Shumer 1979, 9). 
 
 There are reasons to doubt this official history of corruption as a concept 
common to most all political forms and historical epochs.  For one, the apparent lack 
of a word for bribery in Ancient Greek presents a problem for those who assume an 
unbroken line in the concept of corruption.  Mark Philp notes that there are many 
words in Ancient Greek that make no distinction between a gift and a bribe (doron, 
lemma, chresmasi peithein) since, for the Greeks, to persuade through gift giving was 
acceptable and no perversion of judgement could be assumed (Philp 1997, 26).  He 
makes the point that if the Greeks have no conception of bribery then this puts into 
question the whole idea of a public body in Ancient Greece:  
If these were the only terms for bribery in the Ancient Greek world we 
would have to take the view that there is a basic untranslatability of the 
terms between us and them — that they not only failed to distinguish 
gifts and bribes, but that they also had no real concept of public office 
or trust (Philp 1997, 26). 
 
                                                 
6 Aristotle sometimes identifies four types of constitution, including oligarchy to the 
list above and replacing polity with democracy. 
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He is absolutely right.  He goes on to argue, following Harvey (1985), that there was a 
term for bribery in Ancient Greece, diaphtheirein. However, in opposition to Philp’s 
interpretation, it is not true that diaphtheirein has the same status as the modern term 
bribery or that it can be said to constitute a form of corruption in the modern sense.  
Diaphtheirein refers to the corruption of the mind in that the ability to make sound 
judgements and pursue the ‘good’ has been impaired and, more generally, to 
destruction and decay.  All bribery is not corruption in the modern sense.  A closer 
reading of Harvey’s discussion of diaphtheirein reveals this point.7  Harvey takes 
great pains to show that, in contrast to and concurrent with neutral and positive terms, 
there did indeed exist at least one negative term (diaphtheirein) for influencing 
through giving money and gifts.  Nowhere, however, do we find any reference to 
‘public trust,’ ‘private interest’ or any such category we usually use in discussing 
bribery and corruption.  Bribery as diaphthora was negative because it implied that 
the citizen, by way of accepting a bribe, was no longer able to properly act as a citizen 
since their will and power to judge had been destroyed.  As Harvey puts it: 
The man who takes a bribe surrenders his free will; what he says and 
does he does for another, and in that sense he no longer exists as an 
independent individual: he is a non-entity.  That, I suggest, is the 
essential point (Harvey 1985, 86).   
 
Rather than some ‘public trust’ succumbing to ‘private interests’, the recipient of a 
‘bribe’ has lost the ability to be a citizen by relinquishing his autonomy.  Like slaves, 
merchants, and women, all precluded from being citizens since they all lacked some 
                                                 
7 The more common version of the term is diaphthora, the standard definition can be 
found in the Liddle-Scott Greek-English lexicon (available online at 
www.perseus.tufts.edu). 
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basic requisites for properly acting as a citizen, so the recipient of a bribe is incapable 
of the autonomous thought and moral judgement necessary for being a citizen.8 
 The categories of the public and the private are integral to the modern notion 
of corruption.  Put simply, no corruption in the modern sense is possible if there is no 
public and private.  As Philp’s arguments above illustrate, much of the literature on 
corruption assumes that the apparently omnipresent existence of a concept of 
corruption is a sure sign that the public and private are also omnipresent social 
categories.  That the ancient understanding of corruption is so far removed from the 
modern one puts this assumption into question.   
 Ernst Kantorowicz’s The King’s Two Bodies is a useful corrective to this 
ahistorical tendency in the corruption literature.  For Kantorowicz, our modern 
understanding of public and private is tied to the rise in early modern England of the 
legal and political doctrine of the King’s Two Bodies.  This doctrine asserts that we 
have two bodies, a public and a private one.  In its most developed form, the Two 
Bodies doctrine asserts that, on the one hand, we exist as concrete individuals with 
physical bodies, particular passions, interests, obligations, and so forth.  On the other 
hand, we exist in an abstract sense, as members of the body politic, a body that is 
beyond our physical bodies and concrete social existence.  This body politic is the 
polity, characterized by the common interests that bind its members together and is 
materialized in the rituals, personnel and institutions of the state (cf. Kantorowicz 
1957, 193-272). 
 It should be noted that this version of public and private differs greatly from 
other typical uses of these categories within political thought; notably, the Arendtian 
                                                 
8 Peter Euben (1989) has equated the term stasis, not diaphthora, with political 
corruption.  Stasis refers to the destruction and fracturing of the political community, 
and thus can easily be thought of as an instance of diaphthora.  As with diaphthora, 
stasis does not imply any question of public-private transgression. 
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understanding of public and private, most clearly exemplified by Habermas’ treatise 
on the public sphere.  Habermas notes that the terms ‘private’ and ‘public’ first appear 
in German in the middle of the 16th century and argues that no such divisions between 
the private and public existed in feudal societies, he goes on to argue that they did 
exist in ancient societies and equates the ancient Greek terms of polis and oikos with 
public and private (cf. Habermas 1991, ch. 1).  Thus, in this sense, the categories of 
the public and the private are mainly functional distinctions based on different uses of 
space.  The public sphere becomes the space within which individuals can come 
together and discuss and formulate political opinions and positions.  This is contrasted 
to the ‘state’ on the one hand with its police and legal functions, and to the ‘private’ 
side of civil society on the other hand with its family ties and market relations (cf. 
Habermas 1991, 30).  Although not necessarily mutually exclusive, this functionalist 
understanding of what is public and private is not the public and private of corruption.  
In political corruption, private interests and passions come to displace the common 
good.  It is not that ‘public’ spaces come to be used for non-political goals, for 
example, that makes for political corruption.  Thus, although we often see the 
categories of public and private applied to most all societies, including the ancient 
world, it is usually done so in this more functionalist way and the categories 
themselves have little in common with the ways that the ancients understood and 
organized political life.9  
 In line with these observations, the categories of public and private that our 
modern concept of corruption presupposes are fairly recent.  Even up to Machiavelli, 
                                                 
9 This brief discussion of the categories of the public and private is necessarily 
skipping over many important questions and debates.  A much more extended 
discussion of these points is needed to demonstrate the full import and causes of this 
rise of the public/private split.  Toward this end, and in addition to Kantorowicz, 
Norbert Elias’ The Civilizing Process, particularly his discussions of how the king 
becomes transformed from a feudal lord into a ‘public’ functionary, is a seminal text. 
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in contrast to the argument by Schumer noted above, our modern concept of 
corruption seems to be lacking.  In addition to the argument regarding the rise of the 
public and the private we also have the question of the rise of the concept of interests.  
As Albert Hirschman has argued, it is only in the modern era that the concept of 
interests emerges and this marks a radical break with pre-modern conceptions of the 
good.  For Hirschman it is the increasing dominance of finance and money that 
explains the change in the term ‘interest’ from being simply a financial term to a 
concept that is central to our understanding and organization of contemporary politics 
(cf. Hirschman 1977).10  It is in this context that Hirschman sheds light on the 
question of Machiavelli’s notion of corruption and notes how the term corruption 
went through a similar transformation in meaning as interest:  
“Corruption” has a similar semantic trajectory.  In the writings of 
Machiavelli, who took the term from Polybius, corruzione stood for 
deterioration in the quality of government, no matter for what reason it 
may occur.  The term was still used with this inclusive meaning in 
eighteenth-century England, although it became also identified with 
bribery at that time.  Eventually the monetary meaning drove the 
nonmonetary one out almost completely (Hirschman 1977, 40).11 
                                                 
10 Marcel Mauss’ The Gift is also relevant to this question.  “The very word ‘interest’ 
is itself recent, originally an accounting technique: the Latin word interest was written 
on account books against the sums of interest that had to be collected.  In ancient 
systems of morality of the most epicurean kind it is the good and pleasurable that is 
sought after, and not material utility.  The victory of rationalism and mercantilism was 
needed before the notions of profit and the individual, raised to the level of principles, 
were introduced.  One can almost date — since Mandeville’s The Fable of the Bees 
— the triumph of the notion of individual interest.  Only with great difficulty and the 
use of periphrasis can these two words be translated into Latin, Greek, or Arabic 
(Mauss 1990, 76).”  See also Louis Dumont (1977) on the rise of these ideas.  
11 The question of corruption is particularly confusing in the case of Machiavelli 
because already present in his work is the public/private split and the question of 
interests, as when he states that “So the senators sent two ambassadors to beg him to 
set aside private enmities, and in the public interest to make the nomination 
(Machiavelli 1970, 523).”  In this context, it is easy to accept Schumer’s argument 
that the subversion of the public by the private is one dimension of corruption for 
Machiavelli.  But, even if we accept this argument, Hirschman is still correct in his 
assessment and the concept of corruption found in Machiavelli is still very much 
traditional because private interests in this context function as bribery did in the 
earlier example, as something that decreases virtue.  Thus, private interests are bad in 
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 The Greek term of diaphthora and the Latin term of corruzione, in spite of 
their usual translation as corruption, refer to an understanding of corruption that is 
quite foreign to our modern one.  Political corruption is an exclusively modern 
phenomenon made possible only after the rise of the public/private split and the 
concept of interests.  While it may be quite impossible, and not particularly important 
from the perspective of the present work, to provide some specific date or event that 
signals the moment that our modern concept of corruption emerges, it is appropriate 
to locate it within the general processes of modernity and claim that our 
understanding of corruption becomes possible and thinkable as capitalism and the 
state emerge and become dominant.12 
Why Corruption? 
                                                                                                                                            
themselves and corruption is not simply the improper presence of private interests 
within the public.  For example, the idea Schumer puts forth that average citizens are 
corrupted by their privatization is completely unthinkable from the point of view of 
the modern understanding of corruption.  It does not make sense in the modern 
context to say, for example, that voters are corrupt because they vote according to 
their private interests.  In fact, it is never possible to say that ‘private’ citizens are ever 
corrupt in the modern sense of the term (although they can certainly be corrupting, as 
when they tempt public officials with bribes and favors).  This difference between the 
traditional and the modern understanding of corruption is further examined in the next 
section. 
12 Given that the modern concept of corruption becomes thinkable at any point after 
the rise of the public/private split, it seems possible, in opposition to both Mauss and 
Hirschman, that the modern use of the term occurs well before either Mandeville 
(Mauss’ argument; The Fable of the Bees was published in 1714 with the very 
revealing subtitle Private Vices, Publick Benefits) or the late 18th/early 19th century 
(Hirschman’s argument).  For example, Francis Bacon was convicted of political 
corruption qua bribery in 1621.  He famously confessed, “I am guilty of corruption 
and do renounce all defense.”  Given the dominance of the Two Bodies doctrine in 
Elizabethan England and the relative novelty of convicting a judge for bribery (at that 
time, it was common for judges to receive gifts from winning parties) it seems very 
likely that already with Bacon we have the use of the term of corruption in the modern 
sense.  The important point here is that the rise of the modern concept of corruption 
should not be thought of as an event but, rather, as a process that begins with the rise 
of the Two Bodies doctrine and becomes fully realized by the time of the bourgeois 
revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries. 
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 To note the novelty of the modern concept of political corruption and to note 
the basic preconditions of its existence begs the question of why the term corruption 
came to represent the idea of the subversion of the public interest by private interests.  
This is even more the case when one notes deeper differences in meaning between the 
two concepts of corruption.  In the traditional understanding of corruption, there was a 
strong imagery of decay and regression, of something becoming less and less capable, 
potent or virtuous.  The idea that through disease, old age, the influence of vice, or 
any other reason, the ability to seek the good and virtuous is decreased/destroyed.  
Here, we have the corruption of the mind, morals and the will.  The term still retains 
this meaning today, we completely understand the use of the term in the claim, for 
example, that the youth of Athens were corrupted by Socrates and we use the term in 
essentially the same way when we claim that the minds of the young are corrupted by 
the entertainment industry or that the ability to make sound decisions is corrupted by 
religious cults, various psychological disorders, and so on.  What is interesting here is 
that there is a clear division of good and bad, vice is never good nor is disease or 
psychosis.   
 By contrast, in the modern understanding of corruption there is not a division 
based on something that in itself is good and desirable and something that is not.  
Private interests are not bad.  Quite the opposite, the whole line of questioning from 
Weber’s The Protestant Work Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism to Hirschman’s The 
Passions and the Interests has been focused on explaining how private interests, 
particularly in the economistic sense, came to be welcomed as something positive.  
How then can two things, public and private interests, that are in themselves seen as 
proper and good come to constitute something that is bad and improper?  Mary 
Douglas does much to answer this question when she notes that notions of purity and 
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cleanliness have nothing to do with something that in itself is dirty.  For Douglas, dirt 
is best understood as something that is out of place: 
Shoes are not dirty in themselves, but it is dirty to place them on the 
dinning-table; food is not dirty in itself, but it is dirty to leave cooking 
utensils in the bedroom, or food bespattered on clothing; similarly, 
bathroom equipment in the drawing room; clothes lying on chairs; out-
door things in-doors; upstairs things downstairs; under-clothing 
appearing where over-clothing should be, and so on.  In short, our 
pollution behaviour is the reaction which condemns any object or idea 
likely to confuse cherished classifications (Douglas 1966, 36-37). 
 
Private interests and public interests are both perfectly fine, as long as they stay in 
their proper places.  Once we have the contamination of the public by the private, 
politicians and politics itself become dirty, tainted, infected, and thus corrupt.  The 
opposite is equally true, once we have an invasion of the private by the public (for 
example, public authorities being able to regulate ‘private’ behaviors such as sexual, 
religious, and so forth) we come to equally negative conclusions regarding the 
transgression of the categorical separation of private and public.  The modern notion 
of political corruption is thus much closer to the idea of corruption as adulteration 
rather than as deterioration and destruction.  This idea of political corruption is 
consistent with the use of corruption to describe the loss of the purity of one substance 
by the introduction of another, the way that wine can be corrupted by water or a 
flowerbed can be corrupted by weeds.   
 To further emphasize these differences in meaning, let us take as an 
illustrative example the likely possibility that Ronald Reagan had Alzheimer’s disease 
in the later years of his presidency.  Assuming that it had progressed to the point of 
hindering his ability to make sound decisions, this would constitute corruption in the 
classical sense in the same way that bribery constituted corruption — his capacity to 
think and act in an autonomous and rational way was diminished.  It is obviously not 
corruption in the modern sense since there is no instance of the contamination of the 
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public interest by private interests.  The Clinton coffee scandals, where prospective 
campaign contributors were invited to coffees at the White House, are an example of 
the opposite.  It is hard to imagine that drinking coffee could ever result in corruption 
in the traditional sense (unless one became so addicted to it that the ability to reason 
was lost, one had to resort to crime in order to support the consumption of coffee, and 
so forth) but it can easily result in corruption in the modern sense.  If that coffee is 
being consumed by prospective campaign contributors in a ‘public’ area, say the non-
residential areas of the White House, it can be said to constitute political corruption 
because the President is allowing his private interests to contaminate the purity of the 
public space.  This space within the White House is not ‘public’ simply because it is 
owned by ‘the public’ but rather because it is there for his use as a public servant and 
not as a private citizen.  If coffee is being consumed and contributions being sought in 
space that is recognized as there for the President’s use as a private individual, no 
corruption is present.  The same people, the same coffee, the same money changing 
hands, the only difference being what room it is occurring within is all the difference 
between corruption and non-corruption.13   
 In light of these stark differences, how is it possible that the modern and 
traditional ideas of corruption are so easily conflated and confused?  Although the 
meanings are very different, both understandings of political corruption attempt to 
establish a normative distinction between what is desirable and what is not.  In the 
traditional understanding of political corruption, the characteristics of a citizen, king, 
                                                 
13 Note the similarity of this understanding of corruption with the claim of Bin Laden 
et. al. that the presence of Westerners in the Middle-East is a corruption of the sacred 
spaces of Islam.  There is nothing ‘bad’ or ‘evil’ about Americans as such, the 
problem is that they are out of place.  The same logic was used by German fascists, 
the basic political problem is that things are out of place and the political project of 
Nazism is to return things to their ‘proper’ order.  The problem for the Jews and 
Gypsies is that there is no ‘proper’ space to return them to, thus they are always a 
corruption.  The only ‘solution’ is to eliminate them altogether. 
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or regime as they should be are established and contrasted with those characteristics 
that are seen as bad/undesirable from the point of view of that desired reality.  In the 
modern understanding, a strict division of the public and private is asserted and 
various phenomena that may conflict with that presumed division are termed a 
corruption.  This difference between what should be and keeping things in their 
‘proper’ place is immensely significant.  On the one hand we have a normative 
political project that posits what the good is and on this basis is able to establish what 
is corrupt/bad.  On the other hand we have the desirable/undesirable distinction 
established in a more technocratic and underhanded way.  The proper ordering of all 
things social is posited in the form of ontological assumptions regarding the 
public/private and phenomenon that pose a challenge to this vision of how things are 
become branded as corrupt.   
 Since the modern concept of corruption does not function as an explicitly 
normative construct but rather as an articulation of categories of bourgeois political 
ontology, it has the effect of constituting and reaffirming the dominant public/private 
split through its application and subsequent categorization of phenomena as corrupt or 
uncorrupt, as normal and pathological.  In so doing, the normative dimension of the 
modern concept of corruption becomes manifest precisely because of its way of 
categorizing social phenomena.  By establishing the division between the normal and 
pathological in the public/private split, the modern understanding of political 
corruption is at once making a statement of fact and presenting us with the political 
goal of fully realizing the ‘normal’.  As Georges Canguilhem notes in his discussion 
of the foundations of the concept of the normal: 
In the discussion of these meanings [of normal] it has been pointed out 
how ambiguous this term is since it designates at once a fact and “a 
value attributed to this fact by the person speaking, by virtue of an 
evaluative judgement for which he takes responsibility.”  One should 
 19
also stress how this ambiguity is deepened by the realist philosophical 
tradition which holds that, as every generality is the sign of an essence, 
and every perfection the realization of the essence, a generality 
observable in fact takes the value of realized perfection, and a common 
characteristic, the value of an ideal type (Canguilhem 1991, 125). 
 
In this way, the modern concept of corruption repeats the normative/political 
emphasis of the traditional understanding of political corruption but does so in an 
essentialist and apolitical way.  The confusion of the two concepts of political 
corruption thus appears to be, at least partly, a result of the similar normative function 
of situating what is politically desirable and what is not.  But, none the less, already 
built into the modern concept of corruption is an ahistorical and acritical 
understanding of political phenomena that takes the integrity of the public/private 
split at face value, as a quality immanent in all societies, as the normal.  For this 
reason, it is rare that the historical specificity and social embeddedness of the concept 
of political corruption becomes visible to observers.  Similarly, by conflating the two 
concepts of corruption, the reception of the modern concept of corruption reifies it 
back throughout history and gives the public/private split the appearance of the 
eternal. 
 Characteristically, most contemporary discussions of political corruption 
within political science occur within the sub-field of comparative politics, not 
normative political theory.  Under the guise of discussions on clientelism, patronage, 
totalitarianism, civil society, and so forth, comparative politics has spent much of its 
time demonstrating the normalcy of the United States and other advanced capitalist 
societies by demonstrating the pathologies of ‘less developed’ nations.14  Very much 
                                                 
14 In addition to most all the contributions in what is undoubtedly the best known and 
most authoritative collection of readings on the subject, Heidenheimer et. al.’s 
Political Corruption: A Handbook (1989), there are hundreds of essays in this 
tradition to be found in the many mainstream journals that cater to area studies and 
comparative politics, particularly in reference to Asia, South America, Africa, and 
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in line with the comments by Canguilhem quoted above and already illustrated in the 
introductory discussion of TI and Koutsoukis, an omnipresent assumption in this 
literature is that the public and private are essential attributes of human societies; that 
political development and advancement entail the realization of this fact and the 
formation of institutions, laws, and attitudes that end the systematic corruption 
prevalent in these under-developed societies.  The following quote from Jacob van 
Klaveren is typical: 
We know that the political systems of the so-called underdeveloped 
regions still remain in the stage of systematic corruption, and there are 
good reasons for this which we cannot go into here.  For simplicity’s 
sake, let us say that the Age of Enlightenment has not yet, in a relative 
sense, occurred there, which is not too surprising considering the low 
educational level (van Klaveren 1989, 557).15 
 
In a different context, even a political commentator as astute as Hannah Arendt argues 
that totalitarianism is characterized by the effacement of the public-private distinction 
(cf. Arendt 1968).  Totalitarianism then is a corruption of the separation of the public 
and private, a pathological negation of the separation of the public from the private, 
and it is certainly less desirable than the normal articulation of the public/private split 
                                                                                                                                            
Eastern and Southern Europe.  In this context, Greece has consistently been presented 
as the most pathological and backwards of all non-(ex)communist European states.  
To a significant degree, the cultural and geographic proximity of Greece to the ‘east’ 
is often seen as the main culprit.  Even today, when the many racist pitfalls and the 
mechanistic and formalistic tendencies of these modernization theory type arguments 
are well known, some contemporary Greek commentators continue to use the dualistic 
categories of modern/traditional in order to explain the paradoxes of Greek politics.  
Notably, Nikiforos Diamandouros (2000) has recently attempted to explain the 
peculiar trajectory of Greek politics by arguing that a cultural dualism (East/West – 
traditional/modern) has plagued Greek society.  
15 Most all commentators on political corruption, including van Klaveren, would 
readily admit that corruption occurs even in liberal capitalist societies, the main 
question is whether it exists as a transgression of accepted rules and institutional 
norms or whether is exists in a systemic way.  Similarly, the question is often 
presented as one of frequency, corruption exists everywhere but there are pathological 
elements in underdeveloped societies that result in it being much more common there 
than in the developed world, “Corruption obviously exists in all societies, but it is also 
obviously more common in some societies than in others and more common at some 
times in the evolution of a society than at other times (Huntington 1989, 377).” 
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in liberal societies.  In this respect, Arendt is no more capable of going beyond the 
essentialist bourgeois conception of the public and private than are mainstream social 
scientists and their theories of modernization and development. 
Rules of Separation: From Leviticus to Washington D.C. 
 The writings and categorizations of academics, however, are not the cause of 
the division between what is considered a normal and a pathological ordering of the 
public and private.  The academic categories are no more than reflections of the 
categories and normative precepts prevalent in bourgeois societies themselves.  As 
such, what we must understand is how bourgeois societies come to form and regulate 
their conception of normalcy regarding the public/private split.   
 As Canguilhem first argued in The Normal and the Pathological, and as 
Foucault demonstrated in his various histories of the practices of normalization 
(especially Madness and Civilization), the question is not simply one of how the 
normal is constituted but how the normal is constituted by way of the production of 
the pathological.  The ‘normal’ in the case of corruption, just as it is in the case of 
physiological diseases and mental disorders, is largely a negative category, normal is 
that which is not pathological.  And how do we know what is pathological?  There are 
rules that inform us of what is pathological.  The term normal itself derives from the 
Latin term norma, rule.  The normal is that which conforms to the rule.  Conforming 
to the rule when it comes to political corruption thus refers to not transgressing the 
rules that regulate the purity of the public and private.  If breaking these rules is 
constitutive of the pathological, corruption, then following the rules can be nothing 
but the normal, good and desirable.  If we are to understand how the normal is 
constituted, we must be able to identify those rules that define the pathological and 
upon whose presence the presumed purity of the public depends.   
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 Mary Douglas’ analysis of rules of separation is a useful point of departure for 
such an analysis.  As already noted above, Douglas argues that societies will tend to 
declare ‘any object or idea likely to confuse cherished classifications’ as 
impure/dirty/corrupt.  These classifications, in turn, are themselves dependant upon a 
conceptual edifice ‘whose key-stone, boundaries, margins and internal lines are held 
in relation by rituals of separation.’  Most interesting in terms of its implications 
towards the analytical task at hand is how Douglas applies these principles in her 
explanation of the various rules regarding clean and unclean food in Leviticus.  
Douglas attempts to solve what has long been considered a puzzle by biblical 
scholars, how to explain why some animals are considered unclean and others clean:   
Why should the camel, the hare, and the rock badger be unclean?  Why 
should some locusts, but not all, be unclean?  Why should the frog be 
clean and the mouse and the hippopotamus unclean?  What have 
chameleons, moles and crocodiles got in common that they should be 
listed together (Douglas 1966, 42)?16 
 
As Douglas notes, there have tended to be two ways of addressing this problem, that 
these rules are arbitrary, irrational and unexplainable or that they largely serve 
educational and disciplinary functions — such as the teaching of self discipline by 
selecting the most tasty and tempting of creatures as unclean, selecting those animals 
that were most likely to harm health and carry disease, or as rules developed to protect 
Jewish culture from the encroachment of neighbouring cultures  (Douglas 1966, 30-33 
and 44-50).  Having identified the contradictions and inconsistencies in all of these 
attempts to explain the rules, Douglas attempts a new explanation by treating these 
various rules as exactly what they purport to be, rules of separation.  Douglas notes 
                                                 
16 Douglas, mistakenly, assumes that frogs are clean because they are not listed by 
name in the relevant sections of Leviticus.  She explains this apparent anomaly of a 
lizard being clean as a result of frogs having four feet and jumping (as opposed to 
other lizards, which do not have four feet and swarm and creep).  That frogs, despite 
their four feet and hopping, are unclean can easily be explained by their amphibious 
nature. 
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that the traditional idea of the ‘holy’ was quite literal, it referred to wholeness, 
completeness, purity of form (Douglas 1966, 51-53).  Thus, for example, animals 
appropriate for sacrifice had to be complete and pure, free from physical 
imperfections and blemishes.  Similarly, for ‘wholeness’ and ‘completeness’ to be 
realized, the organization of the world has to be kept pure.  In accordance of this 
meaning of holy, we find injunctions against sowing the same field with more than 
one kind of seed, against plant and animal hybrids, against making cloth by 
combining two or more kinds of fibers, against bestiality, and so forth.  To be 
heterodox and confusing is unholy, things should be kept in their proper order and not 
mixed.17   
 Clean and unclean foods then have nothing to do with how appetizing or ugly 
or healthy or sloppy the animals are but, rather, how pure they are in terms of 
conforming to their classification.  The animals true to life in the sky are birds, they 
have feathers, two feet and fly.  All those birds that do not fly are unclean since they 
defy these principles as do all those things that fly but are not birds.  The animals true 
to life in the water are fish with scales and fins, all those creatures in the water that do 
not have these characteristics are unclean.  Animals who roam the earth are four-
footed and move by walking, jumping or hopping.  Those animals who seem to have 
two feet and two hands, like crocodiles, mice, and weasels, are unclean.  All that 
swarms is unclean since that mode of propulsion is proper to neither sky, land or 
water.  Thus, worms, snakes, and the like are unclean.  Some kinds of locusts are 
clean because they hop, if they fly they have an attribute that only birds can properly 
have.  Proper mammals have cloven feet and chew the cud.  So, camels, pigs, badgers, 
and hares all lack one or both of these qualifications.  Members of the antelope 
                                                 
17 The common dictum ‘cleanliness is next to godliness,’ apparently derived from an 
old Hebrew proverb, makes sense in this context. 
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family, sheep and goats, cows, and so on, do conform to these rules so they are clean 
(cf. Douglas 1966, 56-58). 
   This example that Douglas provides us with is important for its illustration of 
the idea of cleanliness as keeping things in their proper place.  Moreover, she provides 
us with a model for interpreting other sets of rules of separation.  The task of 
interpreting rules of separation when it comes to political corruption seems somewhat 
different than interpreting Leviticus because we already know what the basic idea 
behind the rules against political corruption is, to keep private interests from 
contaminating the public good.  So, while Douglas’ interpretation of Leviticus is 
compelling in its elegance and in its ability to explain all the seemingly anomalous 
classifications of clean/unclean, it would appear that it would not be of much utility 
for the question of examining rules regarding political corruption.  This would be a 
false conclusion because we only know the general principle behind keeping the 
public/private divisions separate and clean.  Why, for example, is it ok for a U.S. 
congressperson to go on a 7 day trip that is paid for by a lobbyist but not 8 days?  
Why is clientelism corruption and passing laws that benefit campaign supporters and 
contributors usually not?  Why are staff members allowed to lobby the congressional 
representatives they worked for after one year and not four or five years, or never, or 
right away?  The reality is that, with one partial exception, there has never in the 
history of the modern state been a law against political corruption as such.  There are 
only laws against particular examples of what could be classified as political 
corruption: bribery, embezzlement, nepotism, and so forth.  So, although there is no 
need to deduce the general principle regarding political corruption there is a need to 
examine the rules designed to maintain the purity and separation of the public and 
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private if we are to be able to deduce the ideas behind what bourgeois societies 
understand to be corruption and what they do not. 
 In order to make the subsequent discussion easier to follow, a very partial list 
of ethics rules from the U.S. House of Representative follows.  The rules are divided 
according to the kind of activity they refer to and the wording of each rule is exactly 
as it appears in a summary memo of ethics rules that is given to all members, officials 
and employees of the House of Representatives (Committee on Standards of Official 
Conduct 2001). 
The House Gift Rule prohibits acceptance of any gift unless permitted by one of the 
exceptions stated in the rule. Gifts allowed by the exceptions include: 
 
— Any gift (other than cash or cash equivalent) valued at less than $50; however, the 
cumulative value of gifts that can be accepted from any one source in a calendar year is less 
than $100,  
 
— Gifts from relatives, and gifts from other Members or employees,    
 
— Gifts based on personal friendship (but a gift over $250 in value may not be accepted 
unless a written determination is obtained from Standards Committee),    
 
— Personal hospitality in a private home (except from a registered lobbyist),    
 
— Anything paid for by federal, state, or local government.    
 
Members and staff may never solicit a gift, or accept a gift that is linked to any action that 
they have taken or are being asked to take. 
 
Private payment of necessary food, transportation and lodging expenses may be accepted 
from a qualified private sponsor for travel to a meeting, speaking engagement, or fact-finding 
event in connection with official duties.    
 
Limit on number of days at the expense of the trip sponsor:   
— 4 days, including travel time, for domestic travel.   
— 7 days, excluding travel time, for foreign travel. 
 
No use of congressional office resources (including equipment, supplies or files) for 
campaign purposes.    
 
No solicitation of political contributions from or in any congressional office.   
 
Don't accept any contribution that is linked to any official action, past or prospective.   
 
No personal use or borrowing of campaign funds, and no use for official House purposes.    
  
Avoid mixing of House and private resources. 
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Official position and confidential information may not be used for personal gain.    
 
A Member must abstain from voting on a question only if the Member has a direct personal or 
pecuniary interest in the question.    
    
Outside Earned Income Limit for Calendar Year 2001 - $21,765.    
 
For ONE YEAR after leaving office:    
 
— A Member may not communicate with or appear before a Member, officer or employee of 
either House of Congress, or any Legislative Branch office, with intent to influence official 
action on behalf of anyone else. 
 
— Very Senior Staff may not communicate with or appear before the individual's former 
employer or office with intent to influence official action on behalf of anyone else.  
 
 We find all the important components of the concept of corruption that have 
been already identified and discussed present in these rules.  The Two Bodies 
principle is present in those rules that distinguish between the person as a public 
servant and as a private citizen.  Gifts from family, other members of the congress, 
close friends and anything paid for by public funds are allowed (since in all these 
exchanges it is either a private-to-private or public-to-public relationship).  
Hospitality in a private home is allowed as long as that person is not a registered 
lobbyist (thus negating the distinction of a ‘private’ home).  Members must abstain 
from voting on and lobbying for issues they have private interests in.  Similarly, 
omnipresent in these rules is the general prohibition against mixing the public and 
private.  All of the rules are manifestations of this principle, the suggestion to “avoid 
mixing of House and private resources” seems clear enough.  In this way, the main 
contours of these rules clearly conform to the dual conceptual principles of Two 
Bodies and of corruption as a mixing of categories. 
 An interesting grey area is the position of the political candidate.  When it 
comes to incumbent members of the House, their reelection campaigns are clearly not 
on the ‘public’ side of the equation, Congressional staff and resources are not to be 
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used for campaign purposes.  No campaign activity, including soliciting contributions, 
is to take place in any congressional rooms or offices.  Even informational mailings to 
constituents are not allowed 90 days prior to a primary or general election since it 
would be quite impossible to distinguish between the member sending the mailing as 
a public servant or as a candidate.  Conversely, campaign contributions cannot be 
used for public or for private purposes.  It would seem that candidates for office and 
campaign contributions are neither public nor private, it is an interesting in-between 
situation, it is a position that is inherently heterodox and ‘unclean’ by its own nature 
(perhaps equal to larva who, as swarming creatures, are unclean but, once they 
transform into walking/hopping insects, become perfectly clean).  It may be normal to 
be a private citizen, it may be normal to be a public servant, to be a candidate is to be 
neither and, thus, the conceptual position of the candidate must be kept as separate as 
possible from the usual registers of public and private so as not to create any 
confusions. 
 This interesting in-between case aside, the greatest challenge to interpreting 
these rules of separation is being able to explain, first, all those possible forms of 
corruption against which there are no rules and, second, all those rules that appear to 
be arbitrary or, at least, could easily be different and still conform to the general 
principles.  Why should the limit for allowable gifts be set at $50 and not higher or 
lower?  If it were $60 or $100 or $10, would it not still fulfil the same function and 
would not the principles behind the rule remain the same?  Similarly, how can we 
interpret some of the more general and loose rules, such as the prohibition against 
using one’s official position for personal gain?   
 If anything can be gleaned from Douglas’ analysis of Leviticus it is that rules 
of separation are synonymous with the system of ideas, one constitutes the other.  
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There can be no classification of clean and unclean without the rules of separation and 
no rules without classifications.  In this sense, the reason the gift limit is $50 is so that 
there is a limit, so that there is a rule of separation.  Of course, this is not to say that 
the dollar amount is random or that it could be any amount and still retain its practical 
function but the first part to understanding this rule is to understand why there is a 
need to place a dollar amount as a limit in the first place.  Because of the $50 rule, not 
simply some general principle of public/private separation, we can now identify what 
conforms to the rule and what does not, we can now identify the normal and 
pathological when is comes to accepting gifts.  In the same way, the general decrees 
that public office cannot be used for private gain or that gifts and contributions can 
never be linked to actions that have been taken or that will be taken are utterly 
meaningless and have no significance.  Why else would a non-relative/friend give a 
gift to a member of the House or provide a campaign contribution if not as some form 
of support for an action that was taken or they hope will be taken?  It is precisely 
because everyone knows this to be true that limits are established and the rules of 
separation are made specific.18  We find examples of this principle throughout the 
rules.  We know that everyone is potentially a lobbyist so, in order to establish a clear 
distinction, the categorization ‘lobbyist’ is made a technical term referring to those 
who are legally registered as such.  We know that any number of actions while in 
office could result in private gain (indeed, just being in office will result in untold 
numbers of corporations and law firms being willing to pay significant amounts of 
money to employ these same individuals once they leave office), so we have a 
multitude of specific rules that tell us what constitutes private gain and what does not.  
                                                 
18 Obviously, this general prohibition against linking gifts to past or future actions 
simply requires that the exchange not be explicitly linked to actions, giving a gift or 
contribution is fine as long as it is not presented as an exchange for some action. 
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What political corruption is cannot be known without recourse to these rules of 
separation.   
 That the limit to gifts should be $50, that privately sponsored travel has 4 and 
7 day limits, that additional earned income is limited to $21,765, all have another 
foundation as well.  The dollar limit to gifts could have been set at $1000 and the 
basic principle of there being a specific rule by which to determine what is normal 
and pathological would be sustained.  However, it would be more difficult to justify 
that a gift of that magnitude would not constitute a corruption of the public interest in 
the eyes of citizens.  Obviously, the more the value of a gift the less believable it is 
that the person receiving the ‘gift’ was not influenced by it.  It may be quite likely that 
the gift limit could be $100 or that the additional earned income level could be 
$40,000 and it would be just as believable and efficient as the existing amounts, but 
the point is that the specific limits in each rule correspond to some basic parameters 
regarding how such actions are likely to be perceived.  A basic principle that 
underpins much of the content of these rules is that public servants must not engage in 
behaviors that are too overt and obvious in their illustration of how the concrete 
‘private’ body of the public servant conflicts with the presumed purity and objectivity 
of their abstract ‘public’ body.  If former employees and advisors are to lobby you on 
behalf of an interest group, they should at least wait a year, it looks better.  If you do 
take a trip paid for by private money, don’t let it go beyond four days, it doesn’t look 
good.  Maybe it is true that elected public servants will tend to act on behalf of 
important supporters and campaign contributors, but at least don’t make it too 
obvious.  
 The investigation into the violation of many of the rules listed above by 
Representative ‘Bud’ Shuster illustrates this principle.  Shuster, chairman of the 
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Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, became the object of an official 
investigation by the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct (CSOC) largely as a 
result of the apparent collusion between himself and his former chief of staff, who had 
worked for him for twenty two years, Ann Eppard (cf. CSOC 2000a).  Eppard, after 
resigning her post, established her own lobbying firm and lobbied Shuster on behalf 
of her clients during and after the twelve month period following her resignation.  As 
already noted, senior house staff are not allowed to lobby their former employers for 
twelve months following the end of their employment.  The official report notes that 
this restriction, enacted in 1989, was intended “... to diminish any appearance that 
Government decisions might be affected by the improper use by an individual of his 
former senior position (italics in original, CSOC 2000a, 8).”   
 Shuster and Eppard proved to be pretty inept at keeping up appearances.  Not 
only was Eppard the former chief of staff, she was also, while she was lobbying 
Shuster, the assistant treasurer for Shuster’s reelection campaign and a significant 
fundraiser (in itself, it is perfectly legal to be a lobbyist and a campaign officer or 
fundraiser — it simply must not appear to be something that is done in exchange for 
some favor).  Shortly after Eppard began to represent Frito-Lay and Federal Express, 
Shuster pushed through the Congress the granting of a waiver from many federal 
safety regulations for mid-sized delivery trucks (such as those used by both 
companies), “... a quiet lobbying campaign aimed at the House Transportation 
Committee yielded in a few months what years of regulatory struggles had not (CSOC 
2000a, 79).”  After Eppard was hired by Amtrak, Shuster championed a bill that 
provided Amtrak with money and financial restructuring, exactly what Amtrak had 
hired Eppard to accomplish.  After Eppard was hired by the Outdoor Advertising 
Association of America, Shuster argued on behalf of and legislation was eventually 
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passed that allows more billboards to be placed along routes designated as scenic 
byways (cf. CSOC 2000a, 79-82).  There are a great many additional potential rules 
infractions investigated by the CSOC including a trip by Shuster to Puerto Rico paid 
for by one of Eppard’s clients and frequent stays by Shuster at Eppard’s home and his 
frequent use of her car.   
 It should be noted that the CSOC found Shuster to not be guilty of any 
infractions when it came to the three legislative cases noted above.  Although he was 
found to have violated the letter of the law when it came to the twelve month rule and 
gift rules, as well as being guilty of some bad campaign finance accounting and a few 
other minor infractions, all the infractions boil down to the violation of one rule, 
literally rule #1, clause I of the Code of Official Conduct, “a Member, officer, or 
employee of the House of Representatives shall conduct himself at all times in a 
manner which shall reflect creditably on the House of Representatives.”  What 
Shuster was ultimately found guilty of is not being a good enough actor when it 
comes to maintaining the illusion of the public.  The Letter of Reproval issued to 
Shuster by the CSOC reads like a mantra to clause I, it begins by noting “By your 
actions you have brought discredit to the House of Representative” and goes on to 
establishing why each infraction constitutes a violation of clause I: 
The first area of misconduct, constituting conduct that did not reflect 
creditably on the House of Representatives ... The third area of 
misconduct to which you admitted, and which constitutes conduct by 
you that did not reflect creditably on the House of Representatives ... 
The fifth area of misconduct to which you have admitted, and which 
constitutes conduct that did not reflect creditably on the House of 
Representatives ... (CSOC 2000b). 
 
The letter concludes with the following statement:  
 
In our free and democratic system of republican government, it is vital 
that citizens feel confidence in the integrity of the legislative 
institutions that make the laws that govern America.  Ultimately, 
 
individual Members of Congress can undermine respect for the 
institutions of our government ... (CSOC 2000b). 
 
 The purity of the public is specular and illusionary, a performative gesture, a 
product of a series of rules designed to cloak the fetishistic nature of the public/private 
split.  In Leviticus, the division between the clean and unclean was such that by 
following the rules of separation one could completely realize the conceptual goal of 
wholeness as it was understood at the time.  In Washington D.C., the fetishistic nature 
of the public makes it impossible to fully realize the separation of the public and 
private in terms of the actual content of politics.  The legal fiction, as Kantorowicz 
terms it, of the abstract body of the public is materialized and regulated through the 
rules of separation in that what is kept pure is not politics itself but, rather, its 
categorizations and self-presentations.  Given the impossibility of removing ‘private 
interests’ from either the real bodies of public servants or from the actual substance of 
bourgeois politics, a series of rules and practices are instituted in order to purge the 
realm of appearances from acts that challenge the categorization of society as divided 
into two mutually exclusive registers, the public and private.  The success of these 
rules of separation thus rely upon two interrelated principles, to regulate and cloak or 
eliminate all those activities that are likely to be perceived by citizens as a presence of 
private regarding within the public body and to structure the parameters and 
boundaries of what citizens are likely to perceive as corruption simply by serving as 
the point of reference for establishing what constitutes the normal and pathological in 
such matters.   
 That the rules discussed above do not include a great many potential 
corruptions of the public by the private can only be interpreted as a sign that they fall 
within the ‘normal’ side of the equation.  It could easily be argued that members of 
the Congress are corrupt when they vote according to the private interests of 
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constituents in their districts, or that a President is corrupt when he appoints his 
friends to public office, and so forth.  We find nothing against these types of activities 
in the existing rules of separation although in both cases it could be a violation of the 
rules if appearances are not maintained.19  The pragmatic requisites of bourgeois 
politics necessitate that private interests be everywhere within the ‘public’ but that 
everyone categorize these short-circuits as being normal and desirable.  
 In this respect, the rules of separation found in Leviticus and those found in 
Washington D.C. are not based on some really existing truth in nature or society but 
are attempts to formalize and ritualize the meanings and categorizations through 
which society maps its understandings and perceptions.  The attempt to explain the 
rules of separation by reference to the ‘real’ dirtiness imminent in the object or 
activity itself is thus necessarily bound to failure.  Crabs and oysters are no more 
‘dirty’, from the perspective of nutrition or biology, than are salmon and tuna.  
Clientelism is no more ‘dirty’, from the perspective of the nature of the interests it 
articulates, than are pluralist interest group arrangements.  Again, to go back to 
Douglas, it is only in reference to the system of ideas that these rules make sense and 
their object is nothing more than the material constitution and reproduction of the 
system of ideas.  
The Australian Case: Fetishism Revealed 
                                                 
19 Such as with the savings and loan scandals of the late 1980's, it is almost always 
acceptable for members of the Congress to lend support to business interests but when 
it appears as being ‘too much’ support, whatever that may be judged to be, it can be 
said to violate the rules of separation precisely because people judge it as ‘too much’, 
because it does not ‘reflect creditably’ on the state apparatuses.  When it comes to 
having supported savings and loans that failed and cost taxpayers billions of dollars, it 
appears the threshold for what constitutes ‘too much’ is lower than usual.  In this 
respect, it may very well be the case that the only reason Shuster was investigated and 
reproved by the CSOC is because the Journal of Commerce published an article 
raising suspicions about Shuster’s activities and because he was also the object of an 
investigation by the 60 Minutes television program. 
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 That political corruption as such has never been completely outlawed in 
modern societies thus makes perfect sense because the whole point of the discourse 
and practices surrounding corruption has been to make most cases of private 
regarding within the public acceptable and normal by identifying only the some forms 
of private regarding as ‘corrupt’.  If ever there was to be a general rule that no private 
interests are allowed in the public arena, politics as we know it would be impossible 
and every public servant would potentially be guilty of some version of corruption.  A 
fascinating exception to this general principle of rules of separation necessarily being 
specific and partial so as to legitimize all those typical forms of private regarding is 
the Australian attempt to eliminate political corruption.  The Australians have come 
the closest of all to outlawing political corruption in its most general sense and their 
misadventures allow us to see how the conceptual edifice of the capitalist state may 
unravel when it is faced with a literal prohibition of private regarding within its 
institutions. 
 In the wake of a series of corruption scandals in the 1980's, various Australian 
states adopted legislation designed to combat political corruption.  In 1989, corruption 
commissions were established in three Australian states: the Independent Commission 
Against Corruption (ICAC) in New South Wales, the Official Corruption Commission 
(OCC) in Western Australia, and the Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) in 
Queensland.  What is fascinating in these cases is the degree to which not only 
particular types of political corruption are made illegal but how these commissions 
attempted to outlaw political corruption as such.  
 We find in the ICAC Act a general prohibition on ‘corrupt conduct’ in 
unusually broad terms and in ways that come very close to the general understanding 
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of corruption as any mixing of the public and private.  For the ICAC, corrupt conduct 
is: 
(a) any conduct of any person (whether or not a public official) 
that adversely affects, or that could adversely affect, either 
directly or indirectly, the honest or impartial exercise of official 
functions by any public official, any group of public officials; 
or 
 
(b) any conduct of a public official that constitutes or involves 
the dishonest or partial exercise of any of his or her official 
functions; or 
 
(c) any conduct of a public official or former public official that 
constitutes or involves a breach of public trust; or 
 
(d) any conduct of a public official or former public official 
that involves the misuse of information or material that he or 
she has acquired in the course of his or her official functions, 
whether or not for his or her benefit or for the benefit of any 
other person (Commission on Government [COG] 1995, 237-
238). 
 
Rather than use the term ‘corrupt conduct’, the CJC uses the term ‘official 
misconduct’ but defines it almost exactly the same way (cf. COG 1995, 241-242).  
The OCC rules are also very similar and include the distinction between ‘corrupt 
conduct’ (in effect, all conduct by public officials that violates the criminal code) and 
‘improper conduct’ (conduct that is defined exactly the way the ICAC defines 
‘corrupt conduct’ and the CJC defines ‘official misconduct’) (COG 1995, 45-46). 
 Whether it is termed ‘corrupt conduct’, ‘official misconduct’ or ‘improper 
conduct’, the Australians have attempted to outlaw any breach of objectivity, any 
impure action/non-action by all public servants.  When compared with the ethics rules 
found in the U.S. Congress, the Australian rules seem extremely general and 
ambitious.  There is an almost unlimited number of potential infractions that could 
constitute ‘corrupt conduct’.  Not only is it enough to show some lack of objectivity, 
even the possibility that some conduct could result in such a lack, directly or 
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indirectly, could result in that conduct being considered corrupt.  It would be possible, 
for example, to argue that some elected official was not objective because they were 
making decisions and engaging in conduct that was focused upon their reelection 
possibilities and not the objective and full exercise of their official functions, or that 
bureaucrats were corrupt for putting the interests of their institutions and offices 
above the public good, or that members of the parliament were voting according to 
party line and, thus, were corrupt because they were putting the cohesion and interests 
of the party above the need for members of parliament to be objective.  Any non-
public regarding could constitute corrupt conduct.  Of course, just because there are 
many kinds of conduct that could be considered corrupt given the above definitions 
does not mean that the various corruption commissions have applied and interpreted 
these new rules in particularly broad ways.  Although the political institutions of 
Australia and have not self-destructed and we do not find thousands of public servants 
seeking asylum from corruption commissions gone amuck, there are some 
illuminating examples of how the expansive nature of these rules have come into 
conflict with what most would consider ‘normal’ conduct by public servants.   
 The ICAC case involving Terry Metherell is probably the most clear and 
famous example of conduct typical of public servants being found corrupt.20  In April 
of 1992, Metherell, a member of the parliament in New South Wales, resigned from 
his position and accepted an appointment as a director of the Environmental 
Protection Agency.  Metherell, a former member of the Liberal Party, was one of five 
independent members of the parliament that was otherwise split with forty seven 
members belonging to the Liberal Party and forty seven members belonging to the 
                                                 
20 The significance of the Metherell case to the question of corruption has been 
discussed by Philp (1997).  Philp cites the case to illustrate the difficulties of defining 
political corruption in a satisfactory way.  
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Australian Labour Party, Nick Greiner, of the Liberal Party, was the Premier for New 
South Wales (ICAC 1992a, 6-8).21  Metherell’s resignation allowed the Liberal Party 
to regain his seat and take a one seat lead over the Australian Labour Party.  That the 
Liberal Party benefited from Metherell’s resignation and that they had appointed him 
to a well paying position the same day he resigned was the reason that the case was 
investigated as a potential case of political corruption.   
 The ICAC found Nick Greiner (and one other Minister, Tim Moore) guilty of 
having engaged in corrupt conduct.  The reasoning behind the finding was that “... the 
conduct of each man involved partial exercise of his official functions, that it involved 
a breach of the public trust, and that it could involve reasonable grounds for their 
dismissal as Ministers (ICAC 1992b, 4).”22  The appointment of Metherell was 
obviously not based on who could best serve the public good but rather on the 
political gains that could be realized by Metherell resigning from his elected office.  
Greiner acted in terms of what was in the best interest of the Liberal Party (and, thus, 
also himself) and, by so doing, was obviously not acting in an objective way and in a 
way that conformed to the full exercise of his official functions (recall the ICAC 
definition of corrupt conduct noted earlier).  Greiner attacked the logic of the ICAC 
definition of corrupt conduct in his testimony, he declared that it constituted the end 
of politics:23 
If what the Minister for the Environment did and what I did was 
corrupt, then in my judgement every political appointment that has 
ever been made in this State was corrupt.  It will not be the case of the 
Leader of the Opposition or of a Leader in the Upper House reserving 
                                                 
21 Metherell had been a member of the Liberal Party, he had even been the Minister of 
Education and Youth Affairs in the Greiner administration of 1988-1991, he left the 
party in October 1991 (ICAC 1992a, 6). 
22 Greiner and Moore resigned their Ministerial positions and left parliament 
following the ICAC findings.  The ICAC decisions were later declared null by the 
Court of Appeals. 
23 It was Greiner and the Liberal Party that had established in ICAC in 1989. 
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for themselves certain positions that they intend to use for political 
appointments.  It will simply be against the law. ... Ultimately, if what 
we have done was against the law, then all honorable members need to 
understand that it is, for practical purposes, the death of politics in this 
State.  Once a political party is elected to office it will be against the 
law for it to make decisions which are in any way influenced by 
political considerations. ... Under the English common law very 
serious obligations to act in the public interest are placed on those 
elected to public office, and yet our highest public officials are at the 
same time part of a political system which is about what is in many 
ways a largely private interest in terms of winning or holding a seat or 
holding office.  This is a very difficult philosophical matter.  In simple 
terms, the philosophy, which was once called disinterestedness, meant 
that once elected to Parliament members were obliged to ignore the 
interests of their constituents and act only in what they considered to 
be the national interest.  We here in Australia chose not to adopt that 
view of parliamentary office. ... But every member needs to understand 
that the standards that are implied in this censure of me today are 
entirely new standards and are very strict standards.  I am not sure, 
when honorable members have considered them calmly in the bright 
light of day, that those standards that are going to produce a workable 
system of democracy in our State (ICAC 1992a, 65). 
 
 This remarkable testimony by Greiner gets to the heart of the matter.  If his 
actions are corrupt then all of modern politics is corrupt, private interests are inherent 
to politics as we know it.  By making political corruption as such illegal, the ICAC 
has declared politics illegal.24  The House ethics rules discussed earlier have the 
effect of declaring a great multiplicity of presences of the private within the public 
normal and acceptable by establishing rules of separation that declare only some 
forms of this presence as pathological.  The United States, and every other modern 
state, has the good sense to know that a true and substantive lack of the private within 
the public is impossible in bourgeois society.  As already noted, the functional role of 
                                                 
24 The ICAC was troubled enough by this case and Greiner’s testimony that it took the 
time to reconsider its definitions of corrupt conduct.  In considering the arguments for 
and against any changes to the existing laws, the ICAC did not suggest any changes.  
It reiterated the logic of why the definition was so broad as to include conduct that 
could be seen as inherent to the system and argued that the partial and unobjective 
exercise of public office can be just as damaging to the public good whether it is the 
product of bribery or the product of more systemic institutional and cultural forces (cf. 
ICAC 1992b, 14-15). 
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the rules of separation is not to regulate the actual substance of politics but, rather, to 
keep the categories we use to perceive, describe, and comprehend modern politics, 
clean, pure, intact, and believable.  What the ICAC rules accomplish, as the Metherell 
case illustrates, is exactly the opposite.  By taking the idea of political corruption 
literally and seriously, the ICAC is making visible to everyone that the abstract body 
of the public is nothing more than a fetish, nothing more than private interests acting 
‘as if’ they were the national interest and that public servants are always and 
necessarily concrete individuals who are required, by the requisites of maintaining the 
social existence of the state, to act ‘as if’ they also possessed an abstract body.   
  I do not mean to suggest that the ICAC with its definition of corrupt conduct 
has single-handedly destroyed the conceptual edifice of the Australian state or the 
fiction inherent in the private/public split, although it certainly does not help them 
any.  What the ICAC does do is enable us to appreciate the importance of rules of 
separation in the constitution of the public/private split in contemporary societies.  
The division of society into two bodies, the public and the private, so integral and 
constitutive of the state itself, relies upon rules and rituals/everyday practices that 
constantly reaffirm and reassert the naturalness and compulsion of this division. 
 
Part II: Accumulation 
A democratic republic is the best possible political shell for capitalism. 
 -V.I. Lenin, State and Revolution 
 
The Opacity of Transparency 
 
 The importance and implications of the forgoing towards the question of 
corruption in Greece will be explored in the concluding section of this paper but a 
major weakness in the argument as it has developed so far must first be addressed.  In 
spite of the arguments of the previous section, the current fascination with corruption 
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and the recent emergence of organizations like TI remain a mystery.25  After all, if the 
main function of the concept of corruption is to maintain the purity of the categories 
of the public and private, one would expect that the question of corruption should be 
exclusively a domestic affair and one of no particular importance to international 
organizations or far flung corporations and financial institutions.  Why should the 
World Bank or Enron or cadres of well paid and well connected technocrats place so 
much effort into producing lists and press releases that argue that Greece is the most 
corrupt member of the EU?  A related mystery is why TI, an organization that is 
dedicated solely to combating corruption, should name itself Transparency 
International?  In what ways is lack of transparency concurrent with corruption?   
 This is not to say that all of the efforts by TI, USAID, as so on, are detached 
from the question of legitimacy and the normal/pathological distinction already 
discussed.  There is no doubt that these organizations view the cultures and 
institutions of the ‘corrupt’ societies as dysfunctional and inferior.  The claim that 
poverty and lack of development is mainly caused by corruption fits right in with the 
longstanding vision of the global periphery and semi-periphery as replete with 
cultures and habits that limit their progress.  It may very well be that Rudyard Kipling 
would have been sympathetic to TI’s arguments.  He may have even sent off for TI’s 
Corruption Fighters’ Tool Kit.  It comes complete with lesson plans for teachers who 
wish to teach anti-corruption values to their dark skinned students, plans for how to 
begin an anti-corruption day in your overly corrupt corner of the world, ideas for 
making and distributing your own anti-corruption cartoons, and so on.  There seems 
to be little doubt that corruption is the outcome of political traditions and indigenous 
                                                 
25 In addition to the efforts of TI (which was founded in 1993), major anti-corruption 
campaigns by such notable organizations as the Open Society Institute, USAID, 
OECD, the World Bank, the United Nations, and the European Union have been 
initiated in the last decade. 
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cultures that, in short, are not sufficiently western and bourgeois.  The white man’s 
burden is still very much alive and the anti-corruption community is doing its best to 
civilize the beige, brown and yellow of the world.  There is no reason to doubt that 
those behind TI actually believe their press releases, that corruption (as they perceive 
it) is the cause of poverty and underdevelopment.  But this is little more than a 
testament to the degree that they can only see the world from the point of view of 
finance capital.  The logic here is that any obstacle to the flows of capital leads to less 
investment, which, of course, leads to less development.  If only those nasty and 
greedy Greek or Chinese or Algerian or Bangladeshi politicians and bureaucrats were 
more honest, then there would be more investments, less unemployment, less poverty, 
and everyone would be better off.  
 Despite all theses obvious similarities to the colonial view of the world and its 
academic manifestations, the current movement against corruption is not simply or 
even mainly about presenting the periphery and semi-periphery as pathological in 
some way.  In order to understand the timing of this current war against corruption, its 
links to the current stage of globalization must be emphasized.  Similarly, rather than 
focusing simply on the question of culture, an examination of the anti-corruption 
movement and its relation to the state and capitalist accumulation is necessary for 
anything approaching a rigorous understanding.   
In this context, the curious naming signals that, from the perspective of TI and 
its supporters, the question of corruption is concurrent to the question of transparency, 
that the problem with corruption is not so much that certain interests may or may not 
prevail in a given context but that administrative and decision making processes be 
readily visible and comprehendible to interested observers.  It is here that we see that 
the main purpose behind TI and the many other recent efforts against so-called 
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corruption.  Corruption as such, the subversion of the public good by private interests, 
takes a back seat to the desire for predictability, lower transaction costs for capital and 
the elimination of all informality in regulations and rules.  A very revealing 
component of TI’s Corruption Perceptions Index is PricewaterhouseCoopers’s (PWC) 
Opacity Index (OI).26  PWC does not burden itself with all those niceties that TI 
emphasises, talk of ‘civil society’, the world’s poor, and so on.  It is very direct and 
honest regarding the purpose of its research and index, to aid capital in its investment 
decisions.  The OI attempts to gage all those hidden, non-transparent, costs involved 
in investment around the globe.  This ‘opacity’ includes ‘corruption’ in the narrow 
sense of bribes but also includes in its measure the tendency for policies and 
regulations to be irregularly applied or changed unpredictably.  The ‘opacity’ measure 
can be expressed in terms of a ‘risk premium’ when it comes to purchasing sovereign 
bonds or in terms of a ‘tax equivalent’ when it comes to direct investment (cf. PWC 
2001).  Thus, when it comes to direct foreign investment, in addition to whatever 
formal, transparent, taxes there may be in a given county, a prudent investor should 
also factor in the additional costs that occur because of bribes, unpredictable policy 
changes, and the like.  According to the most recent OI, for Greece the tax equivalent 
of its opacity is 22%, for the UK 7%, for the US 5%, for Italy 15%, for Russia 43%, 
for Turkey 36%, and for China 46% (PWC 2001, 2).27   
                                                 
26  The CPI is an index of indexes.  The 2002 version draws upon fifteen indexes, one 
of which is PWC’s Opacity Index.  Other indexes include those by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit, the World Economic Forum, and Political & Economic Risk 
Consultancy.  A complete list of indexes can be found at 
http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2002/cpi2002.sources.en.html. 
27 Beyond the forgoing are all the information costs that accompany ‘opacity’.  
Companies such as PWC are paid to produce risk assessment measures and 
individuals who are familiar with the local informal arrangements and clientelist 
networks, for example, must be hired.  Knowing how much of a bribe must be paid 
and to whom doesn’t come cheap. 
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In this light, the corporate and governmental sponsors of TI as well as its 
curious naming make perfect sense.  It is not some overarching notion of public 
interest that is being protected from private interests, rather, it is certain kinds of 
particular interests (mainly those of international capital) being protected from rent 
seeking behaviour by public servants as well as any unforeseen shifts in public policy 
that may occur because of the rise and fall of competing clientelist networks, populist 
tendencies, and so on.  Characteristically, following the Enron fiasco TI reprinted an 
editorial from the Financial Times that argued that no significant changes were need 
regarding the presence of corporate interests in the legislative process: 
The business of America really is business and this salient fact is based 
in constitutional and cultural conditions that will not easily be 
repealed. …  The really shocking thing is that none of this makes 
America a fundamentally more corrupt place.  This symbiotic 
relationship between companies and those who govern them can 
actually lead to better governance, protective laws and steadily rising 
prosperity.  The right consequences of the Enron affair should be 
measures that refine and improve this partnership, not abolish it (Baker 
2002). 
 
Neither USAID, nor TI, nor the World Bank, nor their corporate patrons, are arguing 
against corporate interests being determinates of public policy. From the perspective 
that equates corruption to opacity, the presence of private interests within the policy 
making process is fine.  It only becomes a corruption when it results in some lack of 
transparency. 
Instrumental Reason and the Relative-Autonomy of the State 
 
  The foregoing points to a much more basic element within contemporary 
forms of governance, legal rationality.  Max Weber’s famous three ideal types of 
authority are charismatic, traditional and legal-rational (Weber 1978, 212-254).  Each 
is distinguished by the reasons someone would obey a command (Weber 1978, 36).  
Put simply, in charismatic authority the reason for obedience is an affectual response 
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to the person giving the command, in traditional authority commands are obeyed out 
of habit, and in legal-rational authority commands are obeyed because of a rational 
calculation.  Rationality refers to a cost-benefit calculation that functions as the basis 
of the action, thus someone would obey a particular command or rule because they 
judge it to be in their best interest to do so, the benefits outweigh the costs.  For such 
instrumental reason to be possible, however, one must be able to gage costs and 
benefits.  Instrumental rationality presupposes law and the consistent enforcement and 
interpretation of the laws through bureaucratic organization.  For example, unless you 
know the penalty for parking illegally it is impossible in most cases to make a rational 
decision as to whether or not to follow parking regulations since the costs are 
unpredictable.  It may be the case that in matters of life or death or other extreme 
situations the penalty will always be less than the benefit but, in the vast majority of 
cases, the difference between a penalty being two or twenty or fifty or a hundred 
euros will be very significant and this has to be known and predictable for 
instrumental reason to be possible. 
Accordingly, the push for transparency can be understood as an effort to 
secure the conditions necessary for instrumental reason.  Capitalist enterprises tend to 
follow the logic of instrumental reason, maximizing utility and engaging in actions 
where the benefits outweigh the costs.  When it comes to the state and its regulations, 
capital depends upon the presence of law and bureaucracy in order to be able to make 
rational decisions regarding their investments.  The lack of ‘corruption’ from this 
perspective is equal to the intelligibility and predictability of state regulation.  The 
actions of TI and similar organizations illustrate the measures that capital and its 
servants undertake in order to secure the conditions necessary for instrumental reason.  
The need for predictability necessitates that state forms be made as bureaucratic as 
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possible and that laws be posited, clearly written, and consistently applied.  All 
informal arrangements, confusing laws and inconsistent enforcements become 
branded as opaque/corrupt. 
An element within this process of the rationalization and bureaucratization of 
the state form is the securing of the relative-autonomy of the state.  The relative-
autonomy of the capitalist state refers to the autonomy that the state enjoys from 
particular interests (Poulantzas 1973).  As Poulantzas famously argued, for the state to 
function as a capitalist state, it must be able to go against some particular interests in 
order to secure the general conditions necessary for capital accumulation.  Although 
he did not emphasize the question of predictability, the desire for ‘transparency’ and 
the forming of relative-autonomy go hand in hand.  Let us take the question of 
clientelism as an important and indicative example of this relationship.  There is little 
doubt that capitalist interests are a significant part of clientelist networks in Greece 
and elsewhere.  From the point of view of the capitalist class as a whole and the 
general conditions necessary for the reproduction of the capitalist relations of 
production, this may likely present problems in that the pursuing of the interests 
particular to the clients of a given political party or group may often conflict with the 
needs of capitalism as a whole, making it difficult to rationalize the economy in ways 
that incorporates the interests and demands of competing factions of capital or of the 
dominated classes, and so on.28  In addition to these well know arguments there is the 
added problem in that policies become less stable and are susceptible to unpredictable 
shifts and changes.  The opposition to clientelism is not because capitalists do not 
want to have access to and receive favours from public servants, they desire that this 
process take place in a stable and predictable manner.  What happens when there is a 
                                                 
28 For a full discussion of relative-autonomy and its functionality for capital 
accumulation, see Poulantzas (1973)and Jessop (1990 and 2002). 
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change in the ruling party?  What will happen to all the deals, favours, and policies 
that were provided by the previous ruling party?  Clientelism results in 
unpredictability and the potential for acute and sudden damage to the self-interests of 
capitalist entities.  Individual corporations and investors have good reason to prefer 
the corporatist and pluralistic structures typical of advanced capitalist societies to the 
clientelistic arrangements that may tend to prevail in those societies that TI and its 
cohorts categorize as corrupt.   
Of course, the foregoing says nothing regarding the substance of laws and 
policies.  It may very well be the case that in Finland public policies are very stable 
and the bureaucracies very strong and reliable but that, none the less, the substance of 
these policies make it much less attractive for many forms of direct foreign 
investment when compared to China or Poland, for example.  Even when you can 
predict costs exactly, they still may be higher than expected benefits.  Moreover, the 
potential for benefits may be so great that they outweigh the potential ‘opacity’ costs.  
According to the OI, the cost of corruption/opacity in China is equal to a 46% tax.  
None the less, there is plenty of capital flowing into China, presumably the expected 
benefits from these investments outweigh the projected costs and risks.  None the less, 
the form of the state is a major determinant of policy and the attempts to transform 
existing state structures into increasingly bourgeois and bureaucratic forms is a 
pivotal moment in the spread of capital and its internal logic. 
The Globalization of the Capitalist State 
The contemporary movement against corruption and the tendency for the 
institutions of international capital to be the agents behind this movement thus has 
drastic implications regarding the process of globalization and the internationalization 
of certain state forms.  As capital becomes more mobile and more trans-national in its 
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scope, the demands upon all states to become increasingly similar to those in 
advanced capitalist societies become more pronounced, and in ways that go beyond 
the usual arguments regarding the pressures to adopt neo-liberal policies.  In 
opposition to contemporary arguments that globalization results in the weakening of 
the state and the gradual loss of its capacity and autonomy, the arguments above point 
to the opposite.  Capitalists in the narrow sense and capitalism in the aggregate 
demand that states have the autonomy from narrow interests in order to establish 
consistent policies and regulations and that the implementation of these policies be 
predictable and uniform.  Certain modes of interest articulation, such as clientelism, 
as well as the pre-capitalist organizational forms that conflict with these demands 
become branded as opaque and corrupt.  
Contemporary movements directed against corruption are best understood in 
this context.  This not only explains the timing of their emergence but also explains 
their ties to capital and their peculiar understanding of corruption as opacity.  In 
contrast to the usual ways that the question of corruption has and continues to 
function in relation to instituting and maintaining the purity of the categories of the 
public and private, the idea of corruption now also functions as a way of pressuring 
nation-states to adapt to the demands of capital by becoming increasingly 
bureaucratic, predictable and relatively autonomous.  The ‘best possible political 
shell’ for capitalism may be, as Lenin argued, a democratic republic but a state that 
possesses relative autonomy and has a properly functioning bureaucracy is a more 
than sufficient shell for global capitalism today and the creation of such sufficiently 
appropriate shells appears to be an implicit goal for TI and other anti-corruption 
reformers.   
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Conclusion: Future Directions for Research on Corruption and Greece 
 If anything can be gleaned from the arguments presented here, it is that in 
order to understand the question of political corruption in Greece one must go beyond 
Greece and examine the overarching processes that underpin the phenomenon of 
corruption.  All attempts to comprehend corruption in Greece in isolation, as some 
kind of self-contained ‘special case’, is destined to produce trite and naïve 
understandings.  As this paper has demonstrated, there are two interrelated processes 
that are central for understanding how it is that Greek politics become perceived as 
corrupt; first, within the advanced capitalist societies, there are the rules of separation 
that regulate the categories of the public and private and create the perceptions of 
what is a normal or pathological ordering of the public and the private.  These rules 
not only help structure the perceptions within each society but also help determine 
how individuals will tend to perceive and judge other societies. Second, as 
globalization has intensified, the institutions of global capital have begun to equate 
the idea of corruption to that of opacity and have propagated this perception through 
the media and international organizations. 
 Both of these processes have severe implications towards the questions to be 
addressed regarding corruption and Greece.  Most important of all, for the Greek 
context, is the observation that the categorization of something as corrupt/pathological 
is only a referent to categories of bourgeois ontology and says nothing about the 
desirability or worth of that which is categorized.  To call Greek politics corrupt says 
nothing more than it tends to conflict with a particular ordering of ideas regarding the 
public and private.  The formalistic and technocratic equation of ‘corrupt’ with 
‘undesirable’ has to be resisted.  Something can be ‘corrupt’ and be desirable or be 
‘clean’ and be undesirable.  Let us take the question of the Greek national medical 
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system.  The tendency to give ‘envelopes’ in order to receive preferential or attentive 
service is well known.29  From the typical western perspective, such endemic 
‘bribery’ is sure to be labelled an example of corruption and this form of allocating 
medical care is likely to be judged undesirable.  Indeed, I suspect that most Greeks 
would consider it a corruption and something that should be done away with.  
However, if we ignore the informal nature of the exchange itself and focus on the 
larger questions of how egalitarian the distribution of medical care is and how much 
money (bribe included) this care costs compared to other systems – we may very well 
judge the Greek medical system to be superior to many that are perceived as 
‘uncorrupt’.  Is an informal exchange between doctor and patient really more 
troubling than the power that the American Medical Association or the 
pharmaceutical industry have within the U.S. legislature?  It could be, but the point is 
that an argument has to be made, the labelling of something as corrupt cannot trump 
real political discussion and analysis.  What if we formalized ‘envelopes’ and called 
them co-payments?  They would then likely fall under the category of not being 
corrupt, but would the Greek medical system be any better than it was before?   
Similarly, given that the corrupt/uncorrupt designation refers to the purity of 
classification, something being or not being out of place, the focus of explanations of 
corruption should be exactly that – how these categorizations and perceptions are 
formed and regulated.  The examination of the U.S. and Australian cases was, in part, 
an effort to uncover how rules of separation work and to emphasize the point that 
even in cases where politics is judged to be ‘clean’ there is still a presence of private 
regarding within the public, it is just that it is in a form that is considered to be 
acceptable given the rules of separation.  The overarching political function of the 
                                                 
29 ‘Envelopes’ is a euphemism in Greece for bribes given to doctors and other medical 
staff.   
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rules of separation is, given the foregoing, to justify and legitimize all those instances 
of private regarding within the public body that are not deemed pathological.  For 
Greek politics, the significance of this point is that there is no more and no less of a 
presence of private regarding within the public body than there is in the United States 
or Australia or Finland or the United Kingdom or Iraq or anywhere else.  The problem 
for Greece is that even though it may have its own rules of separation, both in the 
form of ethical codes and criminal law and in the form of cultural attitudes and 
practices that have long governed the division between public and private, those 
perceptions endemic to Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom, and other 
advanced capitalist societies have been imported into Greece by way of the media, the 
Greek diaspora, Greek intellectuals, E.U. regulations, and so on.  On the one hand, 
these imported perceptions will tend to lead Greeks themselves to judge Greek 
political life as rife with corruption and thus will tend to the decrease the legitimacy 
of the Greek state.  On the other hand, any attempt to undo the ‘corrupt’ elements of 
Greek politics are bound to further erode support in that the clientelist networks that 
the major Greek political parties are based upon demand that favours and resources be 
directed toward the party faithful.  Such tensions and fissures in contemporary Greek 
politics can and should be addressed in terms of how the perceptions of corruption 
impact the political process, how the rules of separation in Greece are transforming, 
and how long standing mechanisms of interest articulation begin to wither and 
become replaced by more typical and ‘clean’ forms of interest articulation (e.g. 
interest groups).  Moreover, the likely shift away from those traditional modes of 
political life that have become perceived as corrupt is likely to result in new patterns 
of political participation and distribution of public resources.  In the American case, it 
has often been argued that the decline of the patronage system and machine politics 
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resulted in a much lower degree of political mobilization as well as less egalitarian 
distribution of political spoils.  How this may develop in Greece remains to be seen.  
In addition, if and how the transformation of attitudes within the Greek bureaucracy 
occurs will also be a fascinating question to be examined.30  In short, the solidification 
of bourgeois political ontology in Greece opens up many new sets of questions and 
problems to be studied. 
The problem of accumulation also opens up new areas of inquiry.  To what 
extent will the capitalist demand for ‘transparency’ and predictability limit the degree 
to which newly elected ruling parties change existing policies?  Will the Greek state 
become more autonomous from its traditional clients and increasingly rule on their 
behalf rather than at their behest?  Will the perception of risk be minimized in order to 
engender more direct foreign investments?   
Finally, the arguments in this paper have consistently pointed to the ways that 
the question of corruption has served as a means for extending the interests of the 
capitalist class and solidifying bourgeois politics.  Ideally, in Greece and elsewhere, 
the categories of the public and private as they are presently constituted will be 
abandoned as political theology and a limit to real politics.  It may be the case that this 
is not immanent and that modern politics will continue to occupy itself with putting 
things in their ‘proper’ place and with the technocratic tasks of regulation, 
predictability, and risk management.  None the less, the concept of corruption is 
symptomatic of contradictions within the structures of modern politics and capitalist 
society.   As the Australian case illustrated, the contradictions of bourgeois politics 
may often become visible in spite of or even because of the efforts to mask and 
                                                 
30  I was told by the head of one Greek agency that he preferred to hire only those who 
had studied and lived abroad, so that they would be familiar with the ‘proper’ 
bureaucratic attitude. 
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displace them.  The struggles and contradictions crystallized by the question of 
corruption may yet result in radical and unforeseen political change.  
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